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Case No. 20090195-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Shawn Michael Smith, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals the denial of his untimely motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea to one count of aggravated robbery. The Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
case to this Court, and this Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 
78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
After pleading guilty to aggravated robbery, Defendant unsuccessfully 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and this Court denied his appeal. Several years 
later, the trial court ordered a new sentencing hearing under rule 22(e). Defendant 
then filed a second motion to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied that motion. 
Issue la: Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's untimely 
second motion to withdraw his plea? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Issue lb: Was Defendant's second motion to withdraw his plea barred by res 
judicata? 
Standard of Review. Whether Defendant's second motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea was timely and whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on that 
motion are questions of law reviewed for correctness, without deference to the trial 
court's rulings. State v. Lovell, 2005 UT 31, If 13,114 P.3d 575. 
Issue 2: Thirteen years after pleading guilty, Defendant claimed for the first 
time that there were procedural defects in the information. Did the trial court err by 
rejecting this claim? 
Standard of Review: This Court should not review this claim because 
Defendant waived it by not timely objecting to the information. Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(f). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 1995), Utah Code Annotated § 77-2-1.1 
(West 1995), and Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, are included in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Underlying Facts 
In the fall of 1997, Defendant and an accomplice escaped from a detention 
facility for juvenile delinquents near Cedar City. PSI: 2. On October 5,1997, the two 
2 
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broke into a nearby home owned by an elderly couple. PSI: 2. After a brief struggle 
in which Defendant threw the 85-year-old husband to the ground and put him in a 
//hammerlock/, Defendant and his accomplice bound the couple with duct tape and 
chains. PSI: 3. They then ransacked the house, cut the phone lines, and drove away 
in the victims7 car with many of their belongings. PSI: 3-4. Defendant and his 
accomplice were arrested the next day. PSI: 4. 
Defendant pleads guilty 
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count 
of aggravated burglary, all first degree felonies. R. 3-5. On October 29, 1997, 
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery. R. 23. In exchange, 
the remaining charges were dropped. Id. 
Defendant signed a plea affidavit setting forth the terms of the plea and his 
understanding of the rights that he was waiving. R. 29-34. Following a plea 
hearing, the court accepted Defendant's plea. R. 23; 491:1-5. 
Defendant unsuccessfully moves to withdraw his plea 
Later that day, Defendant filed a handwritten letter with the court asking to 
withdraw his plea and receive a new attorney. R. 38. The only reason offered was 
that Defendant now "disagree[d] with the plea." Id. Defendant filed another letter 
3 
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two weeks later again asking to withdraw his plea, claiming that he now " want[ed] 
to go to court/7 R. 37. 
On December 2, 1997, the trial court denied Defendant's motions and 
proceeded with sentencing. R. 40-41. Defendant was never asked to speak in his 
own behalf. Instead, his counsel spoke and asked the court to order probation. R. 
492: 4. But the court noted that Defendant's criminal record already included 
convictions for 17 felonies and 31 misdemeanors. R. 492:5-7; PSI: 11-18. The court 
sentenced Defendant to 5-years-to-life in prison. R. 40-41; 492: 7. The written 
sentence was entered on December 16,1997. R. 45-47. 
Defendant unsuccessfully appeals 
Defendant timely appealed, and the trial court appointed new counsel for the 
appeal. R. 53, 59, 90. On appeal, Defendant argued that: (1) his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not properly investigating his case before the plea, and (2) his plea 
was invalid due to several alleged violations of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. R. 120. On November 12,1999, this Court issued a per curiam opinion 
rejecting both claims. See State v. Smith, 1999 UT App 332, 1999 WL 33244771 
(Addendum B). First, this Court held that the record was inadequate to review 
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim. Id. Second, this Court held that 
Defendant's rule 11 claim was unpreserved. Id. Because Defendant had not argued 
plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court declined to address the merits of 
4 
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that claim. Id. On September 20,2000, the Utah Supreme Court denied Defendant's 
petition for a writ of certiorari. R. 178. 
While the appeal was pending, Defendant moved for resentencing under rule 
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant argued that his sentence was 
imposed in an illegal manner because he was not given the opportunity to allocute 
at his original sentencing hearing. R. 97-98. The trial court denied the motion, 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was pending. R. 104. 
Defendant appealed that ruling, but that appeal was denied. R. 107-11,113,131. 
After successfully moving for resentencing several years later, Defendant 
files a second unsuccessful motion to withdraw his plea 
On August 10,2000, Defendant filed a second motion for resentencing under 
rule 22(e). R. 145-47. In that motion, Defendant alleged that his sentence was illegal 
because: (1) the trial court should not have sentenced him without investigating 
Defendant's original request for new counsel; (2) his right to allocution was denied 
at sentencing; and (3) that he was not given the opportunity to contest alleged 
inaccuracies in the PSI. Id. The State timely objected to that request. R. 169. For 
5 
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reasons that are unclear in the record, the trial court did not rule on Defendant's 
second rule 22(e) motion, and the case remained dormant for seven years.1 
In February 2007, the trial court apparently discovered the pending motion 
and asked the parties to rebrief it. R. 206. On February 14,2007, Defendant filed a 
third rule 22(e) motion, again claiming that he should be resentenced because his 
right to allocution was violated at the original sentencing. R. 212. 
On June 5, 2007, the court issued a written ruling holding that the original 
sentencing court had erred by not inviting Defendant to speak in his own behalf. R. 
246-47. Under rule 22(e), the court vacated Defendant's sentence and ordered that 
he be "resentenced after being afforded his right to allocution." R. 249. 
Before the resentencing, Defendant filed a second motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. R. 266-75. Defendant raised several claims. First, as in his first direct 
appeal, Defendant argued that his plea was invalid because the court violated rule 
11 when taking his plea. R. 270-71. Second, Defendant argued that the plea 
affidavit was invalid because its statement of his potential sentence was unclear, and 
because it failed to mention that he waived his rights to a speedy trial and an 
impartial jury. R. 272-73. Third, Defendant claimed that the amended information 
1
 The record does not definitively explain why Defendant did not press for an 
immediate ruling on his August 2000 rule 22(e) motion. But the PSI notes that 
Defendant was paroled in 2002, violated his parole in 2003, and was accordingly 
reincarcerated. PSI: 2. 
s 
6 
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filed in conjunction with the plea was invalid because he had never initialed it. R. 
274. Fourth, Defendant claimed that there was an insufficient factual basis for the 
plea. R. 274. And finally, Defendant claimed for the first time that the court lacked 
jurisdiction over this case because the original information did not contain a sworn 
statement from a witness. R. 275. 
The trial court denied Defendant's second motion to withdraw his plea. R. 
347-51. The court first held that the denial of Defendant's first motion to withdraw 
his plea was res judicata, thereby barring his claims. R. 349. The court further held 
that because this Court had rejected a challenge to that ruling on appeal and issued 
a remittitur, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider those claims anew. Id. 
Defendant subsequently filed a series of additional motions attacking the 
plea. These included: a motion to dismiss the charges against him, citing alleged 
defects with the information and alleged ambiguities in the underlying factual 
record; a motion to arrest judgment, alleging that the information was defective and 
that there were rule 11 violations at the plea hearing; another motion to dismiss, 
again alleging that the information was defective; and a motion for a 402 reduction, 
again arguing that there had been rule 11 violations at the plea hearing. R. 374-77; 
381-88; 459-63; 472-73. The trial court denied all motions. R. 409-16; 459-63; 472-73. 
7 
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Defendant was resentenced on January 27, 2009. R. 472-73. After hearing 
from the prosecutor, defense counsel, and Defendant, the court again sentenced 
Defendant to 5 years to life in prison. R. 474-76. Defendant again appeals. R. 480.2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was untimely because it 
was filed several years after his plea was entered. As a result, neither the trial court 
nor this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the motion to withdraw. 
Contrary to Defendant's claim, his rule 22(e) motion did not reset the time in 
which Defendant could file a motion to withdraw his plea. While rule 22(e) allowed 
2
 The State does not agree that it was proper for the trial court to order 
resentencing, where Defendant did not raise the issue until two years after 
sentencing, and where the resentencing was not ordered until ten years after 
the alleged violation of the right to allocute occurred. Interpreting a related rule, a 
number of federal courts have concluded that a defendant must timely appeal a 
denial of the right to allocute; if he does not, the issue is unpreserved and the 
defendant must establish that one of the preservation exceptions apply. See, e.g., 
United States v. Rausch, 638 F.3d 1296,1299-1300 (10th Or. 2011); United States v. 
Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d 602,605 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490,503-
04 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936,938 (11th Cir. 2007). Because 
Defendant in this case did not seek to exercise his right to allocute at sentencing, and 
because he then waited two years to raise the issue, the State believes that he waived 
his claim. 
In any event, this Court need not consider this issue. Defendant has already 
been resentenced, and he has not challenged that resentencing on appeal. 
Moreover, as discussed below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider his 
challenges to his underlying plea. 
8 
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the trial court to resentence Defendant, it did not allow Defendant to file motions 
attacking the underlying conviction. 
Defendant's motion to withdraw was also barred by the doctrines of res 
judicata and waiver. As noted by the trial court, Defendant's attack on his plea has 
already been rejected by this Court in his first appeal. Defendant is not entitled to 
again assail that same ruling on the same grounds in a second appeal. Nor may he 
raise new challenges to about his plea that could have been raised before. 
Point II: Defendant also attacks the validity of his conviction on the ground 
that the information was defective. But a guilty plea waives all pre-plea non-
jurisdictional issues. Moreover, Defendant is also incorrect when he claims that the 
alleged defects in the original information were jurisdictional. To the contrary, 
settled authority holds that a defendant also waives any claim regarding defects in 
an information by not raising them before entering a guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY SECOND MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
In Point I of his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 2007 when 
it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Aplt. Br. 13-20. In Point III, 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel in 1997 was ineffective for overlooking the 
9 
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alleged defects in his plea. Aplt. Br. 23-25. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
either claim because the motion to withdraw was untimely. Alternatively, these 
claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. 
A, The motion to withdraw is untimely. 
At the time of his plea, Defendant was required to file any motion to 
withdraw his plea "within 30 days after the entry of the plea." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6(2)(b) (West 1995).3 
This statutory limitation is jurisdictional, and an appellant "must therefore 
comply with" it "if he seeks to challenge the validity of his guilty pleas on appeal." 
Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT11, 1 8,152 P.3d 306; see also State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, 
f 20,114 P.3d 585. An appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of an 
untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See id. 
In this case, Defendant pleaded guilty on October 29,1997. R. 23. The second 
motion to withdraw was filed on July 13, 2007. R. 266-35. The second motion is 
untimely,, and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
3
 In State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f t 6-12,31 P.3d 528, the supreme court held 
that a plea was "entered" for purposes of this statute on the date of sentencing. The 
statute has since been amended, however, and now requires a defendant to file a 
motion to withdraw the plea before sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) 
(West 2009). 
10 
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Defendant nevertheless claims that his motion to withdraw is timely because 
the trial court ordered resentencing under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Aplt. Br. 13-20,23-25. According to Defendant, the resentencing order 
put him in the same position he was in before his original sentence—thereby 
resetting the time in which he could file a motion to withdraw his plea. Aplt. Br. 13-
20,23-25. Defendant is incorrect. 
Rule 22(e) has been narrowly interpreted to only allow a defendant to 
challenge the sentence itself, not the underlying conviction. See State v. Candedo, 
2010 UT 32, t 9, 232 P.3d 1008 (rule 22(e) "cannot be used as a veiled attempt to 
challenge the underlying conviction by challenging the sentence"). In State v. 
Wareham, 801 P.2d 918,920 (Utah 1990), for example, the court rejected a rule 22(e) 
motion that was, "in reality, a second appeal from [the original] conviction." 
Because review under rule 22(e) is limited to the sentence itself, a defendant "is not 
entitled to challenge the conviction through the guise of a motion to reduce the 
sentence, thus avoiding the consequences of waiver and res judicata." Id. 
Given this, Defendant is incorrect when he claims that a successful rule 22(e) 
motion opens the door for a new challenge the underlying conviction. This same 
argument was recently rejected in Grimmett. After pleading guilty and being 
sentenced, Grimmett filed an untimely — and thus unsuccessful—motion to 
withdraw his plea. Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, f^ f 2-3. Grimmett appealed the denial of 
11 
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that motion, but this Court dismissed the appeal, noting that it lacked jurisdiction 
because the motion to withdraw was untimely. Id. at f 3. 
The State subsequently agreed that Grimmett could be "resentenced nunc pro 
tunc," "thereby restoring his right to appeal/' Id. at f^ 5. Rather than proceeding to 
resentencing, however, Grimmett filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Grimmett then raised the same argument at issue in this appeal: that the 
resentencing order had "reopened the section 77-13-6(2)(b) time frame and 
permitted him to file a motion to withdraw at any time before the actual 
resentencing/7 Id. at .f 17. 
The supreme court "rejected] this interpretation." Id. The supreme court 
explained that while the resentencing order provided Grimmett with the 
"opportunity to pursue the direct appeal that he was previously denied," it "did not 
allow him another opportunity" to present other "postconviction motions." Id. at 
If 21 (quotations and citation omitted). After again noting that Grimmett's original 
motion to withdraw was untimely, the supreme court concluded that it had "no 
jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the validity of his guilty pleas." Id. at f 25. 
Defendant is attempting the same maneuver that was rejected in Grimmett. 
After pleading guilty in 1997, Defendant timely moved to withdraw his plea. R. 37-
38. The trial court denied that motion and sentenced him. R. 40-41. When 
Defendant appealed, this Court rejected his claims, and the Utah Supreme Court 
12 
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denied his petition for certiorari review. R. 120,178. At that point, Defendant could 
have sought relief by filing a petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See 
generally Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (West 1999). But Defendant did not. Instead, 
he filed a rule 22(e) motion for resentencing, and then, seven years later, attempted 
to use that resentencing as a vehicle for restarting the entire case. 
Rule 22(e) does not allow this. While Defendant's successful rule 22(e) motion 
did allow Defendant to be resentenced, it did not grant "him another opportunity to 
present" other "postconviction motions" that challenged his underlying conviction. 
Grimmett, 2007 UT11, If 21. As a result, Defendant's current motion to withdraw is 
untimely and his appeal must be rejected. 
B. This claim is also barred by the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. 
Even if this Court had jurisdiction, the trial court correctly concluded that 
Defendant's second motion to withdraw his plea was also barred by res judicata. 
"Res judicata" refers to the "overall doctrine of the preclusive effects to be 
given to judgments. [It] has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion." 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, ^ 25, 110 P.3d 678 
(quotations and citation omitted). "Claim preclusion involves the same parties or 
their privies and the same cause of action. It precludes the relitigation of all issues 
that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior 
13 
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action." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, f 12,99 P.3d 842; see also Macris &Assocs v. 
Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,119,16 P.3d 1214. 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent claim when three requirements are met: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, 
the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the 
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits. 
Macris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93, | 20 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Claim preclusion ultimately "promotes judicial economy by preventing 
previously litigated claims from being relitigated." Allen v. Moyer, 2011 UT 44, f 7, 
259 P.3d 1049 (quotations and citation omitted). "In effect, once a party has had his 
or her day in court and lost, he or she does not get a second chance to prevail on the 
same issues." Buckner, 2004 UT 78, Tf 12. This doctrine applies in "'both criminal 
and civil cases/" State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 8, | 3,176 P.3d 493 (quoting State v. 
Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 931 n.3 (Utah 1992)). 
Defendant has already had his day in court on these claims. As noted, he 
filed a motion to withdraw his plea before his original sentencing, but that motion 
was denied. He then appealed that denial, specifically alleging rule 11 violations in 
the taking of his plea. This Court rejected those arguments. Although it is true that 
the denial was based on counsel's failure to raise a preservation exception, that does 
not matter for purposes of claim preclusion. As noted, claim preclusion "precludes 
14 
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the relitigation of all issues that could liave been litigated as well as those that were, in 
fact, litigated in the prior action/' Buckner, 2004 UT 78, f 12 (emphasis added). The 
claims at issue here were presented to this Court during the first appeal, and this 
Court's dismissal of the appeal resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Macris & 
Assocs., 2000 UT 93, f 20. Claim preclusion therefore applies. 
Moreover, Defendant is incorrect when he suggests that his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel allows him to avoid res judicata. Aplt. Br. 26-27. 
Like the underlying rule 11 claims, Defendant could have raised an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim in his original appeal. Buckner, 2004 UT 78,112. And 
while he now asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
properly raise these claims, Aplt. 23-25, this is not the forum to raise that argument. 
Instead, Defendant could have raised that claim by filing a petition for post-
conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See generally Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-102 (West 1996). But he may not attempt to avoid res judicata by 
instead filing a second, repetitive appeal. 
In addition to res judicata, Defendant's claims are barred by the doctrine of 
waiver. In Utah, it is settled that "[ijssues that could have been raised in the first 
appeal but were not raised are waived." MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941,947 (Utah 
1998); see also DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499,502 (Utah 1997) (failing to raise 
issues ripe for appeal results in waiver of right to raise them at later time); State ex 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rel Road Common v. Rohan, 28 Utah 2d 375,503 R2d 141 (1972). "The reason for this 
rule is simple: Judicial economy and the parties' interests in the finality of 
judgments are in no way furthered if parties are allowed to engage in piecemeal 
appeals/7 MacKay, 973 P.2d at 947. 
Here, Defendant was represented by different counsel in his first original 
appeal. R. 53,59,90. Thus, he could have raised all of these claims — including his 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel—in that appeal. To the extent that 
any of these claims were not barred by res judicata, they are still waived. 
In short, the "'ends of justice demand that a convicted defendant have an 
opportunity to appeal in timely fashion, but once the appellate process has 
concluded, society's interest in the effectiveness and integrity of the criminal justice 
system requires a finality of judgment that should severely limit repetitive appeals 
and collateral attacks.'" Wareham, 801 P.2d at 920 (citation omitted). All of 
Defendant's claims either were, or could have been, raised in the prior appeal. He 
cannot raise them now in this second appeal. 
16 
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II. 
DEFEND ANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE INFORMATION BY PLEADING 
GUILTY 
In Point II of his brief, Defendant separately claims that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction over his prosecution because of alleged defects in the information. Aplt. 
Br. 20-23. 
As discussed above, however, Defendant pleaded guilty. The "'general rule 
applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading 
guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the 
crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged 
pre-plea constitutional violations/" State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61,115,167 P.3d 
1046 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989)); accord Benvenuto v. 
State, 2007 UT 53, t 31,165 P.3d 1195. 
Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty rather than proceeding to trial is not 
entitled to subsequently challenge pre-plea defects, even in post-conviction. In 
Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, f 26,184 P.3d 1226, for example, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that a post-conviction petitioner's available remedies were "limited in light of 
his guilty pleas. By entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, a defendant 
waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to a conviction.... Thus, having pleaded 
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guilty, a defendant's only avenue for challenging his conviction is to claim that he 
did not voluntarily or intelligently enter his plea." 
Moreover, rule 12(c)(1)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, expressly 
requires a defendant to raise any claim regarding defects in the information 5 days 
before trial. If the Defendant does not do this, he is "precluded from raising the 
issue on appeal" and thereby waives the claim. State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201,202 (Utah 
1983); Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f); see also Sherratt v. State, 2010 UT App 167U, * 1; Rich 
County v. Breitweiser, 1998 WL 1758304 at *3 (Utah App. 1998). Thus, contrary to 
Defendant's assertion, defects in the information are not jurisdictional and cannot 
subsequently be raised. See Hall, 671?2d at 202. 
Here, Defendant did not raise this issue before entering his guilty plea. He 
has therefore waived this claim and cannot raise it 14 years later in this appeal.4 
In any event, Defendant is also wrong on the merits. Defendant's claim is 
based on State v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982), where the supreme court 
interpreted a series of statutes that existed in 1982 governing the filing of an 
information. But those statute were replaced in 1992, when the Legislature passed 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-2-1.1, which now governs the filing of an information. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1.1 (West 2009), Historical Notes. Thus, Leary's list of 
requirements is no longer controlling, because the statutes that it interpreted are no 
longer in effect. More importantly, the information in this case complied with the 
requirements set forth in the current statute. Compare R. 1-3 with Utah Code Ann. 
§77-2-1.1. 
18 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's denial of Defendant's motions 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted December [s\ 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
D. 
RYANg/TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Utah Code Annotated § 77-2-1.1 (West 1995) Signing and filing of information 
The prosecuting attorney shall sign all informations. The prosecuting attorney 
may: 
(1) sign the information in the presence of a magistrate; or 
(2) present and file the information in the office of the clerk where the 
prosecution is commenced upon the signature of the prosecuting attorney. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 1995) Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion 
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 
65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 12. Motions 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, 
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with 
this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a 
memorandum unless required by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. If neither party has advised the court of the 
filing nor requested a hearing, when the time for filing a response to a motion and 
the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the motion for de-
cision. If a written Request to Submit is filed it shall be a separate pleading so 
captioned. The Request to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the 
motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the 
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If no 
party files a written Request to Submit, or the motion has not otherwise been 
brought to the attention of the court, the motion will not be considered submitted 
for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, includ-
ing request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of de-
termination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by 
written motion. 
(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or infor-
mation; 
(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; 
(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy; or 
(F) motions challenging jurisdiction, unless good cause is shown why the 
issue could not have been raised at least five days prior to trial. 
(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 76-3-402(1) shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the 
date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten days of 
the entry of conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 76-3-402(2) may be raised at any time after sentencing upon 
proper service of the motion on the appropriate prosecuting entity. 
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(d) Motions to Suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall: 
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; 
(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and 
(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the op-
posing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to determine 
what proceedings are appropriate to address them. 
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by the 
non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the conclu-
sion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time for all 
parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and at the 
hearing. 
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for 
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where fac-
tual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings 
on the record. 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make re-
quests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall con-
stitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such 
waiver. 
(g) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at 
the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
are made orally. 
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prose-
cution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued 
for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or in-
formation. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relat-
ing to a statute of limitations. 
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Opinion 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Appellant appeals an order of the district court denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 
Appellant asserts for the first time on appeal that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in that he failed to make "any 
sort of investigation into the facts surrounding the break-
in and robbery." An ineffectiveness of counsel claim can 
be raised for the first time on appeal only in limited 
circumstances, i.e., when there is new counselon appeal and 
there is an adequate trial record. See State v. Humphries, 
818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). Although appellant has 
new counsel on appeal, the trial record is inadequate to allow 
our consideration of the ineffectiveness claims. The "record 
provides us with none of the facts necessary to establish 
whether counsel's alleged omissions constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel." State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 964-65 
(Utah Ct.App.1998). Specifically, there is no record to 
establish that there exist additional facts that trial counsel 
failed to uncover that would have helped appellant's cause. 
Because appellant's ineffectiveness claims rely on alleged 
evidence that is not part of the record, we decline to reach the 
issue. 
1 Appellant did not request a remand under Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 23B for the purpose of entering 
findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffectiveness 
of counsel. Although the rule allows this court to 
order a remand sua sponte, our discretion is limited 
to those circumstances where the motion would have 
been available to a party. See Utah RApp.P. 23B(a). 
Appellant has not made a sufficient allegation of 
nonspeculative facts that would support a determination 
that counsel was ineffective. See Vessey, 967 P.2d at 
965 n. 5 (stating remand unavailable where defendant 
alleges no facts to support claims or identifies no facts 
potentially helpful to case). Because the motion would 
not be available to appellant, we decline to order a 
remand. 
Appellant next asserts, also for the first time on appeal, that 
the trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) in 
taking his plea. Specifically, appellant contends that neither 
the plea affidavit nor the court's colloquy informed appellant 
of the elements of the crime, nor of the maximum penalty 
therefor. This court may not address issues raised for the 
first time on appeal, including alleged Rule 11(e) violations, 
unless the appellant asserts either plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. See State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 
(Utah Ct.App.1994). Because appellant has failed to assert 
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, we decline to 
address appellant's Rule 11(e) challenges. 
Affirmed. 
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